Indonesian jihadi circles. For instance, Abdel Bari Atwan erroneously states that 'Islamic State has allies in Indonesia's Jamaa Islamiyyah '. 11 This article examines the ISIS phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia in order to broaden the discussion of ISIS beyond its Middle Eastern core and its foreign fighters from the West. It aims to explain how, where, and why the transnational and local intersect as well as the role of religion, particularly in the ideological narratives and recruitment strategies of local jihadi groups. At the heart of this analysis is the question to what extent Indonesians and Malaysians were lured into joining ISIS as a result of its 'universal' ideology and global recruitment strategy or whether they were instead propelled by local Indonesian and Malaysian dynamics into Syria and into 'importing' and 'indigenising' ISIS to advance their own agendas.
Drawing upon interviews with Islamists, police and government officials in Indonesia and Malaysia as well as material from Islamic studies sessions, sermons, Islamist publications, and police depositions, this article argues that the potency and appeal of the extremist narrative of ISIS derives from how it animates and feeds off prevailing debates within Indonesia and Malaysia. 12 These debates revolve around issues such as the nature of
Muslim identity and what it means to be a 'good Muslim', the place of Islamic law in society, relations within the ummah as well as with non-Muslims, and Islamic eschatology. While there is clearly a transnational dimension, the motivations for Southeast Asians to sympathize with or join the Syrian jihad and their engagement with ISIS are ultimately the product of local Indonesian and Malaysian dynamics rather than the 'lure' of ISIS per se. This article 11 Atwan, Islamic State, p.135. 12 A methodological caveat is in order. While research for this article involved extensive fieldwork and interviews, in the case of Malaysia the authors were not able to gain access to detainees and former detainees.
In the case of detainees, Malaysian authorities have been very strict about affording access, and independent scholars in particular have not been successful in their requests. As for former detainees, unlike the case of Indonesia, they are simply not at liberty to speak. Scholars familiar with research conditions in Malaysia would be aware of these constraints. As such, the level of empirical and anecdotal detail cannot match what is available in the case of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the authors maintain that there is sufficient information to make a compelling case for the Malaysian aspects of this article.
thus contributes to the broader scholarly debate on how 'global' the global jihad actually is and the phenomenon of 'glocalisation'. the territory ISIS conquered and the pace at which its forces swept through major cities like Raqqa and Mosul became one of the key reasons for supporting this new jihadi organisation.
The rapid territorial expansion was seen not only as a military success and as evidence of the right strategy, but also as 'divine favour.' 14 The territoriality of ISIS compared favourably to the lack of territoriality of Al-Qaeda and with it Al-Qaeda associated groups in Syria such as Jabhat an-Nusra, and in that respect, ISIS was seen to have succeeded where Al-Qaeda failed.
It also appealed at a more personal level to those who simply wanted to join the jihad, for whom it 'made sense going for the strongest group', and to those who were interested in living in a 'true' Islamic state, the 'true' Caliphate. 15 Thus it is not surprising that recruitment of this is that Malaysian politics became characterised by parties trying to 'out-Islam' each other, as evident from the drive to implement hudud, the move to ban the use of the term 'hot dog', or to legally proscribe the use of the term 'Allah' by non-Muslims for fear of the 'confusion' this might cause to Muslims. 37 Moreover, the fact that it became heavily politicized meant that religion came to be viewed as a zero sum game simply because politics was a zero sum game. that he was so influenced that he didn't even believe his own sons. In the case of ISIS recruitment in Malaysia, there have been several discernible patterns. First, unlike Indonesia, most Malaysians were radicalised and recruited over social media and in cyberspace, where such platforms were the predominant factor in generating sympathy and support for the ISIS cause. This was largely due to the fact that the Malaysian government tightly controlled public activities and space, restricting Islamist organisations through a number of legal and security tools. In addition, effective counterterrorism policies reinforced by strong security legislation have made it more difficult for terrorist groups to form and mobilise in Malaysia. 64 This 'pushed' Malaysian ISIS supporters down the internet recruitment route in order to bypass scrutiny from the security establishment. Notably, in several instances Malaysian recruits had proactively sought out terrorist groups online after they were radicalised from their own exposure to extremist material over the internet, 65 Zahid Hamidi, 75% of the 107 ISIS sympathizers in detention in early 2017 had admitted that they were drawn to the ISIS cause via social media, and the majority of them were first time offenders. 69 Most of them were young, with a few explaining that they admired the heroics of the young, male ISIS fighters they encountered over the internet and later started to identify with them as they learned more about their lives online. 70 Insani, Rusydan Abdul Hadi, and Arisdiantoto. 80 Subsequently, jihadis departing from Indonesia generally went through 'organised' channels linked to existing jihadi networks with prospective fighters covering their own travel expenses. 81 According to one ISIS recruiter, there are 'three steps a candidate has to go through: first, iman (belief), second, hijrah, and third, jihad. Of these 'iman is the only level to be accomplished in Indonesia.
Hijrah and joining ISIS in Syria
After that you have to join the system.' 82 Iman is imparted through the pengajian and candidates are evaluated on their proficiency in reading the Quran, fasting on Mondays and Thursdays, and their behaviour more generally. 83 They then undergo an evaluation by a panitia lokal (local committee) or panitia hijrah (hijrah committee), separate to the pengajian. The committees or panels could be attached to any of the groups associated with the pro-ISIS network. They were ad hoc in nature, based on loose selection criteria, and if the applicant was successful he was given a tazkiyah (letter of recommendation). Gaziantep by bus or plane. 89 In total, he organised the hijrah of 39 people. 90 By August 2015, some 19 women and 43 Indonesian children had successfully made the journey to Syria.
Another 15 women and 20 children had been intercepted and deported from Turkey. 91 In January 2016, Sidney Jones estimated that the total number of Indonesians in Syria stood at 'just over 400 nationals,' 45 per cent of which 'were women and children, and not all the adult males were fighters.' 92 Most of these Indonesians joined ISIS but it is also estimated that between 20 and 40 Indonesians have been involved with Jabhat an-Nusra both as fighters and humanitarian aid workers. 93 In 2017, this number had reached 700-800 and despite the military operations against ISIS in Raqqa, Indonesians were still trying to go to Syria. While it is important to understand the local Southeast Asian dynamics in order to ascertain why ISIS enjoyed appeal in Indonesia and Malaysia, it is also useful to place Indonesia and Malaysia into the broader context. Here it is perhaps necessary to consider why there were not more Indonesians and Malaysians who joined the Syrian jihad. Geographical distance is an obvious factor. Indonesia and Malaysia -indeed, the entire Southeast Asian region -is geographically far removed from the conflict zone in Syria. This made it logistically difficult for ISIS sympathisers to realise aspirations to be a physical participant in the Syrian jihad. It also made it more expensive, which explains the onerous lengths to which Indonesians in particular have had to go in order to raise the funds required to finance their hijrah to Syria. In fact, this factor was acknowledged by ISIS central, which called for Southeast Asians to wage jihad locally in the event they could not make the hijrah to the Islamic State territories.
A second factor that accounts for the difficulty that Indonesians and Malaysians faced in participating in the Syrian jihad is the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in both countries. This is especially so in Malaysia, which has a long and well established tradition of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations bolstered by strong internal security legislation that is currently absent in the Indonesian legal system. And last, but certainly not least, the Islamisation of politics in both Indonesia and Malaysia, and in particular the growing influence of Islamist proponents of the implementation of Syariah in both countries, has provided considerable opportunities for above-ground pro-Syariah activities that have achieved far more than the sporadic violence carried out by ISIS cells, let alone ISIS-inspired lone wolves.
It is clear from this study then that the potency and appeal of the extremist narrative of ISIS in Southeast Asia derives from how it animated and fed off prevailing debates. While the structuralist and universalist ideology and narrative of ISIS continues to capture the headlines, careful consideration and contextualization of extremist activity in the region has
shown that those who have sympathized, expressed support for, and left to join the ISIS jihad were in fact significantly propelled by local dynamics into which the phenomenon of ISIS was 'imported' and 'indigenized'.
